by Márcio Scalercio

Coalition Presidentialism is perhaps the best expression we can use to interpret the political-institutional situation that has been predominant in Brazil since the sanctioning of the 1988 Federal Constitution. Summing up the situation, the four presidents elected into office within what could be called the scope of the liberalization and redemocratization of Brazil have all failed to benefit from any clear party political hegemony within the National Congress.

The first direct presidential election after the redemocratization - held in November 1989 - was won by Fernando Collor de Mello. President Collor ran for the PRN (the Party for National Renewal). The PRN was, in fact, a relatively insignificant party, with no great national scope and/or support, and for many was no more than an effectively 'rented' populist springboard or mandate into presidential office. The following Executive, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, won two terms in office as president - at the 1994 and 1998 elections -  supported by two more politically heavyweight parties - the PSDB (the Brazilian Social-Democratic Party) and the PFL (the Liberal Front Party). The current president, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), won the 2001 election leading a coalition of left-wing parties headed by the PT (Workers' Party).

As previously stated, none of the president elects benefited from any form of solid hegemony in the Federal Legislative, which meant they all had trouble guaranteeing the support base to achieve a majority in pushing through important votes in the reigning multiparty system. Even Cardoso, who was backed by the PSDB - a party with a firm support base in the all-important state of São Paulo, the wealthiest and most powerful in the Federation - and the PFL, a group of individuals that comprised the more traditional political old guard, particularly from the northeastern region, was obliged to coordinate complicated and often misrepresented political alliances, assume commitments and make pledges of all types in exchange for the votes required in Congress. At the time, the opposition groups denounced the practice affirming, with a heavy dose of sarcasm, that the government was implementing a policy of Franciscan favors "by giving you will receive", in an allusion to the famous prayer by Saint Francis of Assis.

But President Lula, who was undoubtedly the most outstanding personality in the opposition, saw himself fall into the same trap immediately after taking office in 2002. His party, the PT, had 91 federal deputies and 14 senators, nowhere near a majority in either of the chambers, as there are 513 members of the Lower House and 81 members of the Senate (Upper Chamber).

Like his predecessor, Lula saw himself constrained by Coalition Presidentialism once again. Abandoning the PT's previous more radical program, he drew up, shielded by his trusted advisors, often frightening (for the left-wing old guard) alliances with political parties and personalities representing the more conservative factions of Congress, as he also cultivated or made approaches to leaders whose careers had always been based on favored clientele and corruption. For many Brazilian analysts, these are the most evident origins of the "mensalão" bribes-for-votes scandal that first broke in July 2005, based on the accusation that the government was paying cash for deputies' support in the bills most important to President Lula in the legislative assembly.

System Unlikely to Change After Next Election

Looking ahead to the 2006 general election, Brazil is indeed 'girding its loins' for a new presidential dispute although nothing indicates that the Coalition Presidentialism paradigm will change. And there at least two good reasons on which to base this opinion:

First, even though we know that Coalition Presidentialism causes problems, we cannot forget that the fragmented party system is nothing more than a crystal-clear reflection of the complexity of the political forces and lobbies behind some of them present in the country today. A vast range of different ideological opinions and interests are spread throughout Brazil with the clinging strength of jungle vines. Of particular note are regional interests. Many political leaders in Brazil may hesitate or even uproot their beliefs in terms of their ideological, party or religious loyalties, but regional commitments are harder to ignore and tug free from the grassroots of popular support.

Second, at least up until now, Coalition Presidentialism has not drastically affected the economy. Since Fernando Henrique Cardoso first took office, in terms of economic policy, there appears to have been a clear majority among the country's political leaders, with no adventurers or bravado on this front. Lula's government has been emblematic in its approach to this issue. Once in power, it effectively abandoned its radical PT left-wing rhetoric, embracing a significantly more conservative economic policy based on  Cardoso's legacy. Domestic and foreign investors as well as economists have breathed a collective sigh of relief as Lula's increasingly cautious stance has developed during his administration, and he has sought to underscore that he has no intention of being a 'bad boy' in terms of his governing of the country's economy.

Even so, the Lula government still makes the headlines almost daily and its actions provide more than enough 'material' for a veritable media feeding frenzy. This shows, as far as public opinion is concerned, as well as political power bargaining, wheeling and dealing, that government members are indeed involved in questionable activities and practices to maintain a situational majority in Congress. As there is really no ideological and/or programmatic fight, the debate is marked by reciprocal accusations of corruption between the government and opposition, while in public eyes the impression is growing that the leading parliamentarians are actually on target about what they are saying about one and other.

Latin America´s Global Ambitions

The new Latin America has recently demonstrated an inclination toward becoming a global force to be reckoned with, and is, to say the least, "more actively pursuing this goal". On the one hand, the outrage being shown by President of Venezuela, Hugo Chaves, against U.S. President Bush in particular and the United States in general; on the other hand, the "concern" being voiced by Argentine President, Néstor Kichner, about the IMF; and in the center, Evo Morales, recently elected in Bolivia, who is now trying to implement an alternative policy approach for his country. Lula has kept his distance from all the above appearing to believe that by earning a "medal for good behavior" in terms of the Brazilian economy, he will effectively stamp his passport to re-election. The main problem is that the next presidential mandate in Brazil may be hampered by innumerous blank and null votes and abstainers (the volatile undecided swing vote), a reflex of the growing number of disillusioned electors directly due to the grip Coalition Presidentialism now has in Brazil.

© Márcio Scalercio 2006